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Abstract 
We present the results of an experiment measuring social preferences 
within couples in a context where intra-household pay-off inequality 
can be reduced at the cost of diminishing household income. We 
measure social norms regarding this efficiency-equality trade-off and 
implement a cross-country comparison between France and Germany. 
In particular, we show that German households are more inequality 
averse and are thus less efficient than French households. A 
decomposition of this difference reveals that approximately 40% is 
driven by diverging sample compositions in the two countries, while 
60% of the initial French/German difference remains unexplained. 
Beliefs differ significantly from observed behavior in both countries. 
Efficient choices are overestimated in the German sample and 
underestimated in the French. 
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1. Introduction 
France and Germany are close neighbors, sharing many economic and cultural traits. However, there 
remain fundamental behavioral differences concerning gender roles in the family. Most French 
mothers remain closely connected to the labor market whereas many German mothers reduce their 
employment hours and take up a larger share of household work1. Intra-household income differences 
thus tend to be lower in France than in Germany. Differences in either institutions or values may 
explain these facts. Regarding institutions, family policy is somewhat different in the two countries. 
The supply of subsidized child-care for children less than three years old is largely insufficient in 
Germany, (in Western regions covering only 10% of the demand), while public institutions provide 
more facilities for external child-care in France (BMFSFJ 2008 and OECD 2011a). Regarding values, 
as asserted by Hofstede et al. (2011), the French society presents ‘feminine’ traits, i.e. (emotional) 
gender roles overlap. The German society is said to be more ‘masculine’, i.e. material success matters 
and gender roles appear more differentiated. Since these differences can give rise to larger income 
inequalities within German couples compared to French couples, they may also be the cause of 
different norms concerning equality among spouses. To test this hypothesis we present an experiment 
designed to measure social preferences within the family using a simple allocation task that implies an 
intra-household equality-efficiency trade-off. 
Many econometric studies measure cross-country variations of income inequality aversion using 
survey data (Clark, Senik 2010). However, cross-cultural experiments based on actual behavior are 
scarce2. A specificity of our approach is that we focus on intra-household income inequality tolerance 
which may be of importance in understanding the gender biased arrangements within families. In our 
design, reducing intra-household inequality has a household cost that hinders maximization of 
household income. In this respect, our analysis is also related to the experimental literature that aims at 
experimentally testing the efficiency of household decision-making. While Iversen et al. (2006) run a 
field experiment to analyze a social dilemma game between couples in rural Uganda, Peters et al. 
(2004) perform laboratory experiments where the participants are involved in a public good game with 
varying counterparts. The latter study finds that family members contribute more to the public good 
when grouped together than when playing with strangers. Cochard et al. (2009) generate similar 
results when analyzing cooperation within couples: spouses’ internal cooperation in a Prisoner’s 
dilemma is also higher than when paired with strangers. However, cooperation within the couple is 
still not at its maximum. Munro et al. (2008) provide a test of Pareto efficiency which is closest to 
                                                            
1 43.7% (resp. 65.1% and 67.5%) of working mothers in Germany work part-time if the youngest child is less 
than three years old (resp. less than six years and less than 15 years). The respective numbers are 24.6%, 21.8% 
and 25.4% in France (OECD 2011b). 
2 Oosterbeek et al. (2004) compare the results of an ultimatum game run in different countries. However, the 
difference between France and Germany is not tested. 
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ours. Like Ashraf (2009), Carlsson et al. (2009), Mani (2008) and Robinson (2008) they find 
inefficiency in couples’ decisions, whereas Bobonis (2008) does not reject the efficiency assumption. 
Further, as shown by an experiment in Germany by Beblo and Beninger (2012), if couples are forced 
to cooperate, intra-household distribution of resources depends strongly on each spouse’s contribution 
to the household budget, although pooling is positively related to total household income. This result 
indicates egoistic behavior of the spouses, potentially explaining inefficient decision-making in 
couples.   
2. Task and Predictions 
The task (see Table 1) consists of five consecutive rounds concerning a payoff allocation between 
spouses. For rounds 1 and 2, efficiency implies a self-sacrifice. Both spouses respond to this task but 
only one of the two is later randomly selected as decision maker. No interaction between the spouses 
is allowed. Each round consists of selecting either an equal allocation to both partners (option A: 200 
units for the couple split equally) or a higher joint payoff for both partners where inequality between 
partners varies across rounds (option B: 300 units for the couple).  
Table 1: Intra-household allocation task 
 option (A) option (B) 
round share for self share for other share for self  share for other  
1 100 100 0 300 
2 100 100 75 225 
3 100 100 150 150 
4 100 100 225 75 
5 100 100 300 0 
Decisions in this task may be related to well-known economic models of household behavior (for an 
overview see e.g. Chiappori and Donni, 2009). Efficient models (whether ‘unitary’, issued from 
cooperative game theory, or ‘collective’) predict the maximization of household income. Non-
cooperative models predict similar results to a game played amongst strangers where joint income is 
not necessarily maximized. Behavior would depend on social preferences amongst spouses. Hence, 
our task allows the classification of participants based on their revealed preferences for either joint 
income maximization, own income maximization or partner’s income maximization. Participants that 
prefer option A for the extreme rounds and option B for the middle rounds can be further classified as 
having some concern for equality.  
In addition, participants were also asked to predict the average behavior of all participating men and 
women from their country. These questions consisted of the same five rounds presented above and 
participants were asked to indicate how many participants out of 100 they believe to have chosen 
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either option A or option B. We use beliefs about behavior from other participants as an indicator of 
perceived social norms in either country.  
3. Experiment 
The experiments were held in May and June 2010 in two medium-sized cities in France and Germany 
(Mannheim and Toulouse). In both locations, established, heterosexual couples were invited to 
participate in an economic study, promoted through newspaper reports and flyers. Only couples living 
together for at least one year were eligible to participate. A total of 156 observations were involved 
(France: 69, Germany: 87), i.e. 312 participants. In France, the average age for men was 36 years and 
for women 35 years. In Germany, the average age for men was 41 years and for women 39 years. In 
France, 45 % of participating couples were married, with an average relationship duration of 10 years, 
while 52% of German couples were married, with an average relationship duration of 13 years. 71% of 
the French, but only 37% of the German participants achieved a university degree.  
In Germany, the experiment was conducted by paper and pencil, with sessions involving twelve 
couples. In France, the experiment was computerized, and limited to six couples per session. 
Instructions for the experimental sections were identical in both countries. Payoffs from the 
experiment were converted into euros in the two locations according to an exchange rate specified at 
the beginning of the experiment (10 units = 1 euro in Germany and 20 units = 1 euro in France). For 
more details on the experimental design see the appendix. 
4. Decisions 
We firstly present the aggregate results of choosing the higher joint income option (option B) for each 
of the five rounds of the distribution task. Figure 1 illustrates the outcomes by gender for both 
countries. Results in France are very similar to earlier results obtained by Cochard et al. (2009). 
Approximately 74% of participants choose the efficient option for each of the five rounds. Decisions 
are symmetric concerning the inequality in option B. The difference compared with the German 
sample is particularly noteworthy. Choices are also symmetric concerning inequality in option B, 
however a much larger proportion of participants selected the equal outcome, i.e. option A. 
Specifically for the extreme rounds less than 50% of participants selected option B, and for the two 
intermediate rounds only slightly more than half selected option B. In both countries, we observe that 
men selected the efficient option B generally more often than women. However, the gender difference 
tends to be more pronounced in Germany. 
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Figure 1: Female and male decisions across countries 
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Note : These graphs illustrate the percentages of women and men in each country sample that have opted for 
option B (higher total income but varying unequal shares between me/spouse) against option A (lower total 
income, equal shares). For example, in the first columns the participant receives 0 and the spouse receives 300 
when choosing option B, instead of receiving 100 each when choosing option A. 
We can further use data from the decision task to classify participants into different categories. We 
present the distribution of these types for the French and German sample in Figure 2.  
Figure 2: Types of decision makers 
French sample German sample 
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Note: Subjects who ‘Maximize joint income’ are those who always choose option B; ‘Inequality averse 
symmetric’ subjects are those who sometimes choose option A (100/100), but behave the same way whether self 
or spouse is disadvantaged by the inequality in option B; ‘Inequality averse egoistic’ subjects are more inequality 
averse for themselves than for their partner; ‘Inequality averse altruistic’ subjects are more inequality averse for 
their partner than for themselves. Participants who select option A in the third round when option B (150/150) 
would be more beneficial for both are classified as ‘Irrational’. 
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Approximately 74% of participants in the French sample always choose B and can thus be classified 
as joint income maximizers. Again the difference compared with the German sample is noteworthy. In 
the German sample less than 40% of participants can be classified as income maximizers. An almost 
equally large group can be classified as having some concern for inequality aversion.  
The asymmetry in preferences across countries is also reflected in the outcomes on the couples’ level. 
When we look at both spouses’ choices, we find that in 59% of French couples both spouses maximize 
household income. In the German sample, both spouses maximize joint income in only 22% of the 
cases. By contrast, for 26% of the German couples both partners act in a manner demonstrating 
inequality aversion. 
Table 2: Logistic regression on choosing Option B in round 1 by French and German 
participants                       
 France Germany 
 Coef. St. err. Coef. St. err. 
Dummy female .787 .450 -.342 . 329 
Age -.023 .041 -.026 . 013 
Duration of relationship -.023 .047 -.008 .030 
Dummy married .025 .592 -.398 .442 
Number of children .058 .361 .558 .295 
Dummy university and college degree .650 .472 .884 .363 
Dummy high income (household) .665 .594 -.297 .398 
Dummy female earns more than male 1.66 .933 .433 .481 
Dummy male earns more than female 1.02 .843 -.229 .427 
Dummy female works more than male -.021 .621 .099 .454 
Constant -.195 1.54 1.02 .740 
Number of observations 138 174 
Log Likelihood -67.918 -108.973 
Pseudo r-squared .1066 .0802 
Notes: Coefficient estimates at the 10% significance level are in bold type. Estimations based on Probit or OLS 
regression equations yield very similar results.  
 
In order to assess the importance of various socio-economic variables for the individual efficiency-
equality trade-off decision we apply a multivariate regression analysis. In Table 2 we present the 
estimation results of two logistic regressions – for each country sample separately. The estimates show 
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that the preference for option B in the first round (I receive 0, my partner receives 300) is explained by 
very different factors in the two countries3. 
Among the German participants we see that younger and more highly educated participants with 
children are more likely to choose efficiency over equity, whereas among French participants the 
preference for efficiency is positively related to unequal incomes within the household. Other 
characteristics do not seem to be statistically related to the choices made. 
Both the descriptive statistics presented above (Figure 1) and the regression results regarding the 
participants’ decisions reveal marked differences in behavior in both France and Germany. This may 
in part be due to differing mean characteristics between the French and the German samples. For 
example, 71% of the French but only 37% of the German participants achieved a university degree, 
and the mean age in France was 35.5 years while German participants were 40 years old on average. 
We are able to control for these differences by the use of the decomposition technique initiated by 
Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). Here the mean difference between French and German choices is 
rewritten as the sum of two terms. The first term reflects that portion of the differing decisions which 
arises from differences in the average characteristics between both samples. The second term is the 
portion due to differences in the estimated coefficients, i.e. it represents that part of the observed mean 
difference between choices in France and Germany that is due to systematically differing preferences 
in both countries. For this purpose, we introduce the counterfactual variable 
1
FRchoice  which gives 
the imputed choices of the German participants as if they had the same average characteristics as the 
French sample: 
(1) 
      
   .ˆˆˆ
ˆˆˆˆ
11
FRDEFRFRDEDE
FRFRFRDEFRDEDEDE
FRFRFRDEFRDE
XXX
XXXX
choicechoicechoicechoicechoicechoice





 
When applying Equation (1) to the estimated coefficients (see Table 2) and average characteristics 
(see Section 3) of our data, we find that almost half (41.4%) of the mean difference in choices between 
French and German participants can be explained by differences in the estimated coefficients in both 
samples. We may therefore conclude that preferences towards equity vs. efficiency do indeed differ 
between our French and German samples, even when holding characteristics constant. The conditional 
difference, however, is less prominent than observed at first glance.   
 
 
                                                            
3 This observation is also confirmed when analyzing the remaining four rounds. 
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5. Beliefs 
In this section, we analyze beliefs by men and women concerning the average behavior of all 
participating men and women (from their country) in the study. We observe that beliefs differ 
significantly from observed behavior. Moreover the type of mistakes made differ across the two 
countries and gender.  
From Figure 3 we see that gender differences in beliefs appear to be negligible for rounds 1, 2 and 3 in 
both countries, although men are always expected to be more prone to select the efficient option. 
However, women are expected to be less selfish on average than men, in particular in Germany, as 
half of the German women, but 60% of the men, are expected to choose option B in round 5.  
Figure 3: Beliefs about female and male decisions in whole population  
French sample, whole population German sample, whole population 
Note : These graphs illustrate the mean beliefs (in percentages) for women and men in each country sample for 
choosing option B. For example, French participants believe that 57.8% of men and 57.7% of women choose 
option B in round 1. 
 
Figure 4 shows even more differentiated gender- and country-specific patterns. The graphs show the 
distribution of an indicator of asymmetry in female and male expectations regarding female and male 
choices in rounds 1 and 2, relative to expectations for rounds 4 and 5. Specifically, the more the lines 
are skewed to the left, the more the participants are expected to be egoistic. On the contrary, the more 
the lines are skewed to the right, the more the participants are expected to be altruistic. The figure 
reveals that in Germany, women are believed to be more egoistic particularly by men, whereas in 
France, men are expected to be significantly more egoistic on average by women than by themselves. 
Jarque-Bera tests show that the normality assumption is rejected at the 5% significance level for 
female expectations on female choices and male expectations on male choices in France, and male 
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beliefs about female behavior in Germany. At the 10% level the normality assumption is also rejected 
for male beliefs regarding female behavior in France. For the remaining gender- and country-specific 
subgroups, we can accept statistically the hypothesis that participants believe in people behaving 
symmetrically. Hence, we measure significant differences in gender-specific beliefs across and within 
countries on individual preferences for equity vs. efficiency. This leads us to conclude that the social 
norms concerning these beliefs differ between men and women on the one hand, and France and 
Germany on the other hand.      
Figure 4: Beliefs about average female and male payoff shares 
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Note: The graphs show the kernel density functions of the indicator of asymmetry in mean female and male 
expectations on female and male choices in rounds 1 and 2, relatively to expectations on female and male 
choices in rounds 4 and 5, separately for France and Germany. Example 1: Value 0 for female in the upper 
left graph means that all German women are expected by the women to choose option B in rounds 1 and 2, 
and option A in rounds 4 and 5 (women are expected by German women to have a fully altruistic 
behaviour). Example 2: Value 1 for male in the upper right graph means that all French women are 
expected by the men to choose option A in rounds 1 and 2, and option B in rounds 4 and 5 (women are 
expected by French men to have a fully egoistic behaviour). Example 3: Value .5 means that the 
expectations are the same for rounds 1 and 2, and 4 and 5. 
 
Beyond this, in France, people are expected to be less efficient than they actually are, whereas in 
Germany people are expected to be more efficient than they actually are (except for round 3), as 
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illustrated by Figure 5. It shows, for each round and country samples, the differences between 
expected and actual behavior (i.e. subtracting Figure 1 from Figure 3). For example, in France 
altruistic behavior by men is underestimated by 23.4 percentage points (round 1), respectively 22.5 
percentage points (round 2). The numbers for French women are similar, but somewhat smaller. In 
Germany, women’s altruism is overestimated by 14.2 percentage points, respectively 2.9 percentage 
points, while men behave more or less as expected when averaging over the first two rounds. 
Interestingly, errors in expectations tend to be symmetric in Germany, whereas they tend to be 
asymmetric in France, reflecting the belief that French participants are egoistic, although they actually 
have symmetric choices.  
Beliefs concerning egoistic choices by others can be linked to the observation that general trust in 
France is somewhat lower than in Germany (World Values Survey, 2011, Cahuc and Algan, 2007; 
Willinger et al., 2003).  
Figure 5: Difference between beliefs and actual behavior 
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Note : These graphs illustrate the mean difference between beliefs and actual behavior for women and men in 
each round and country sample in opting for option B. For example, for France in round 1 (i.e. “I get 0/my 
spouse gets 300”), 81.2% of French male participants choose option B, though only 57.8% are expected to do so.  
Hence, altruistic behavior is underestimated by 23.4 percentage points. 
 
Conclusion 
In summary, there is a substantial difference in French and German couples’ efficiency-equality trade-
off decisions. While approximately three quarters of French participants always choose the efficient 
option for the couple instead of the equal repartition between spouses, this is the case for less than half 
of the German participants. Inequality aversion seems symmetric in both samples. When making the 
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country samples more comparable by controlling for socio-economic variables, around 60% of the 
initial French/German difference remains unexplained. Notably, the difference in behavior between 
the two countries does not seem to be driven by existing real-life income inequalities within couples, 
as spouses are not more inequality averse as earnings diverge between them. 
Furthermore, beliefs differ significantly from observed behavior in both countries. In the German 
sample efficient choices are overestimated, while in the French sample they are underestimated and 
people expect much more egoism than actually exists. Having shown that spouses’ behavior can differ 
widely between two neighboring countries of reasonably similar economic and cultural background, 
we can therefore stress the importance of taking into account cross-cultural differences when 
considering the potential effects of social and family policy measures. 
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Appendix: 
Part 1: Instructions (translation) and screen shots from experiment in Toulouse 
 
Translation of text below: 
You will make a number of decisions. 
Each numbered line, proposes two different distributions of FT (Franc Toulousain) between you and 
your partner. 
For each line you have to choose one of the two options: 
option A or option B 
 
Consider for example the first line. In option A, each of you earns 100 FT. In option B, the man will 
earn 0 FT and the woman will earn 300 FT. 
 
For each line you will therefore have to check one of the boxes. At the end of the study we will 
randomly select one of these lines. In addition we will randomly determine whether the decision of the 
man or the woman will be used for the final distribution of earnings. 
 
[screen for the female version] 
 
 
[in the following we present the screens for the male version] 
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Translation of text below: 
What do you think that your partner chose? Select for each line, whether you believe that your partner 
chose option A or option B.  
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Translation of text below: 
What do you think did other women participating in this study decided? Given 100 women 
participating in this study, indicate for each line how many women chose option A. Option B will be 
automatically completed. 
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Part 2: Instructions (translation) and sheets from experiment in Mannheim 
 
Translation of text below: 
In this task you decide about the distribution of money between yourself and your partner by choosing 
either option A or option B. There are five lines. Please tick one of the options in each line. 
 
Each woman and each man makes five decisions. At the end of the study we will select one of these 
decisions and you will receive the respective compensation.  
 
[screen for the female version] 
Option A:  Option B: 
Mein Partner Mein Partner
100
Taler
100
TalerA : 0Taler 300 Taler1 :
100
Taler
100
TalerA : 75Taler 225 Taler2 :
100 
Taler
100
TalerA : 225 Taler 75Taler4 :
100
Taler
100
TalerA : 300 Taler 0 Taler5 :
Ich Ich
100 
Taler
100
TalerA : 150 Taler 150 Taler3 :
B :
B :
B :
B :
B :
Aufgabe 1
In dieser ersten Aufgabe entscheiden Sie über die Aufteilung von Geld zwischen 
sich und Ihrem Partner, indem Sie entweder Option A oder Option B wählen. Es 
gibt fünf Zeilen. Bitte kreuzen Sie in jeder Zeile eine der Optionen an.
Jede Frau und jeder Mann trifft fünf Entscheidungen (eine pro Zeile). Aus allen 
Entscheidungen wird am Ende der Studie nur eine ausgewählt und Sie bekommen die 
dort angekreuzte Auszahlung.
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Translation of text below: 
What do you think your partner has chosen? Select for each line, whether you believe that your 
partner chose option A or option B. 
 
1. Frage zu Aufgabe 1
Was meinen Sie, wie hat Ihr Partner entschieden? Setzen Sie in jeder Zeile Ihr 
Kreuz für Option A oder Option B so, wie es Ihr Partner wahrscheinlich getan hat. 
Meine Partnerin
Option A: 
Meine Partnerin
Option B: 
100
Taler
100
TalerA :
0 
Taler
300 
TalerB :1 :
100
Taler
100
TalerA :
75
Taler
225 
TalerB :2 :
100 
Taler
100
TalerA :
225
Taler
75
TalerB :4 :
100
Taler
100
TalerA :
300
Taler
0 
TalerB :5 :
Ich Ich
100 
Taler
100
TalerA :
150 
Taler
150 
TalerB :3 :
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Translation of text below: 
What do you think did other women participating in this study decided? Given 100 women 
participating in this study, indicate for each line how many women chose option A. 
2. Frage zu Aufgabe 1
Was meinen Sie, wie entscheiden die weiblichen Teilnehmer in dieser Studie 
insgesamt bei dieser Aufgabe? Tragen Sie in jeder Zeile ein, wie viele der 100 
Teilnehmerinnen Option A wählen. Option B müssen Sie nicht ausfüllen.
Ihr Partner
Option A: 
Ihr Partner
Option B: 
100
Taler
100
TalerA :
0 
Taler
300 
TalerB :1 :
100
Taler
100
TalerA :
75
Taler
225 
TalerB :2 :
100 
Taler
100
TalerA :
225
Taler
75
TalerB :4 :
100
Taler
100
TalerA :
300
Taler
0 
TalerB :5 :
Die Frau
100 
Taler
100
TalerA :
150 
Taler
150 
TalerB :3 :
Die Frau
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Translation of text below: 
What do you think did other men participating in this study decided? Given 100 men participating in 
this study, indicate for each line how many men chose option A. 
 
3. Frage zu Aufgabe 1
Was meinen Sie, wie entscheiden die männlichen Teilnehmer in dieser Studie 
insgesamt bei dieser Aufgabe? Tragen Sie in jeder Zeile ein, wie viele der 100 
Teilnehmer Option A wählen. Option B müssen Sie nicht ausfüllen.
Seine Partnerin
Option A: 
Seine Partnerin
Option B: 
100
Taler
100
TalerA :
0 
Taler
300 
TalerB :1 :
100
Taler
100
TalerA :
75
Taler
225 
TalerB :2 :
100 
Taler
100
TalerA :
225
Taler
75
TalerB :4 :
100
Taler
100
TalerA :
300
Taler
0 
TalerB :5 :
Der Mann
100 
Taler
100
TalerA :
150 
Taler
150 
TalerB :3 :
Der Mann
 
